As a follow-up to the initial post about Russia/Georgia by Becky, and the comments by clarita, Toby and combustible, I thought it might be useful to look at the sources of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy not just in the Caucasus but also in
At the heart of Russian foreign policy after the dissolution of the Soviet Union is the attitude of
So after 1991, the
As commodity prices rebounded at the beginning of this decade, Putin took a view towards revising the 1990s: at a time of weakness, outsiders (particularly the US and American oil companies) exploited Russia, while former Soviet republics took advantage of decades of Soviet infrastructure and investment without adequate compensation or including Russia in future plans. Specifically, constructing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (as Becky rightfully pointed out) was an affront to Russia because it cut them out, and Ukraine charging Gazprom transit rates to move gas to Europe while still paying Soviet-era subsidized prices to purchase gas was totally ungrateful. And as these two countries had the temerity to move towards NATO membership, that was the final straw: Putin began moving to reverse the foreign policy losses of the 1990s and reassert control over oil and gas transit resources (as the main source of revenue).
I respectfully disagree with Becky and her colleagues’ recommendation of a lower